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Abstract
An original panel dataset of exogenous fiscal shocks for some Mediterranean
countries is used along with the so-called "narrative" approach introduced by
Romer and Romer (2010) to estimate the tax multiplier. Exogenous shocks
comprise only tax changes motivated by the willingness to improve long term
growth, reduce government debt as well as achieving redistributive goals. En-
dogenous shocks are excluded from the data since they are likely to be cor-
related with output. The aggregate tax multiplier on output is much smaller
than the one found in Romer and Romer (2010): -1, instead of -3 at a three
years perspective. When considering the effect of tax changes on unemploy-
ment, a multiplier of +2.8 is found on a two years horizon; a similar coefficient,
with a negative sign, is found relating government tax liabilities with private
investment, on the same temporal horizon. Splitting the sample between pre
and post-crisis period, a multiplier non significantly different than zero is ob-
tained for the first partition, while significant and equal to -0.75 for the second
subsample.
Key words: exogenous fiscal shocks, GDP growth, unemployment, private in-
vestment, tax multipliers, policy lags.
JEL codes: E02, E21, E24, E62, H21, H30.
1 Introduction
The empirical literature on fiscal multipliers is wide and heterogeneous. One of the
main caveats is related to the fact that the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy,
contrarily to that of monetary policy, has not entirely been uncovered yet. This
fact might contribute to explain why empirical works are so different each from one
another. Moreover the topic is politically sensitive. Broadly speaking, three are the
1Such paper constitutes a revised version of the author’s final thesis aimed at obtaining the
studying title of dottore magistrale within the course in Discipline economiche e sociali at Univer-
sitá Bocconi in Milan. Supervision was provided by Francesco Giavazzi. Advisor was Luca Sala.
Discussants were Alberto Alesina, Carlo Ambrogio Favero and Tommaso Nannicini. Matteo Salto,
at the European Commission, thankfully provided us with the European Union wide set of data
used in the analysis throughout the paper. All errors and imprecisions remain ours.
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main techniques employed by researchers to estimate the so called fiscal multipliers,
aimed at understanding the effects on output arising from a marginal variation in
the level of taxes (or government spending). In the literature the following are ob-
served: (i) vector-autoregressive techniques, relying on a Choleski decomposition; (ii)
anticipated shifts in government spending or revenues and (iii) narrative measures,
also recognized as action-based approach2. The related literature will be considered
briefly, since the aim of the paper is indeed to consistently estimate the effects of tax
changes for some Mediterranean European countries (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain) through the analysis of a dataset obtained by applying the "narrative"
technique.
The article is structured as follows: in section 2 the related literature is discussed;
section 3 contains the core of the narrative analysis3; in section 4 summary statistics
of the data-set are described and compared with all legislated tax changes; section 5
presents the econometric results; section 6 discusses, and section 7 draws conclusions.
A visual representations of all exogenous shocks for each country is provided, in the
appendix.
2 Literature on tax multipliers
The seminal paper introducing VAR methods in fiscal policy is Blanchard and Perotti
(2002). It employed a mix between structural vector - autoregression and event study
analysis, based on the institutional information about the magnitude of spending and
tax changes, as well as their timing4. With a postwar quarterly sample, Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) estimated the effects of fiscal policy on the US economy, finding
counterintuitive evidence that a positive government spending or tax shock has a
negative effect on private investment (as a component of GDP), contrarily than for
consumption. Nevertheless a positive spending shock is found to have a positive
effect on output growth, while a positive tax shock is found to have a negative effect
on the same variable.
2De Vriers et al. 2011.
3Namely for two of the five countries considered, budget laws are analyzed speculating on which
measures could be deemed as exogenous and which endogenous with respect to GDP growth. The
distinction made in Romer and Romer (2010) is adopted: exogenous with respect to output growth
are those reforms based on the willingness to reduce government debt and to improve long run
growth; endogenous are all other measures which have a short term objective of counter-balancing
the business cycle.
4Imposing the identifying assumption that changes in government purchases and taxes are pre-
determined within a quarter.
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Overall, the multipliers are typically close to one, and have been obtained both
in a static and in a dynamic setup. The persistence of the shock is dependent on
whether it has been determined under a deterministic or a stochastic trend (higher
in the former case). Another relevant issue raised in Blanchard and Perotti 2002 is
the anticipation of the shifts, since most of the tax changes are known to economic
actors just a few quarters prior to implementation. It should also be reminded
that Blanchard and Perotti (2002) did not consider the inter-temporal government
resource constraint nor did they include inflation.
Barro and Redlick (2011) explored fiscal policy within a neoclassical framework.
Here the authors focused on the military spending as an instrument driving the
multipliers in the US after 1945. In particular they argued that every study esti-
mating a multiplier higher than two is biased since it is affected by reverse causality,
specifically directed from GDP to non defense purchases. An interesting point of
the paper is that it constructed a series of average marginal income tax shocks and
social security payrolls for almost the whole last century (1913-2006) for US. The
results are consistent with the fact that an increase in government defense purchases
raises GDP growth, but decreases private consumption, investment (purchases of
consumer’s durables) and net exports, given a predominance of the substitution ef-
fect on the wealth effect.
Again, a result based on the effects of military buildups on output, comes from
Ramey (2011). Ramey analyzed the consequences of government purchases on pri-
vate investment as well as employment, finding that private spending falls in sudden
response of a positive spending shock. Ramey also inquired whether raising govern-
ment spending decreases unemployment, and her finding is positive, even though the
largest part of the effect is driven by public employment. This is why she concluded
that government spending has no significant impact in stimulating private activity,
statement which has a non-Keynesian flavour.
Nakamura and Steinssón (2012) found evidence supporting the idea that a spend-
ing multiplier higher than one is typical of the US economy, instead. In fact, they
exploited variations in military buildups across different regions of United States to
prove that their new "open economy relative multiplier" is largely affected by de-
mand shocks. And a 1% increase in regional military purchases has the effect of
increasing national output growth by 1.5%.
Researches of the IMF have also been attracted by fiscal consolidation episodes
within industrialized countries. A fiscal consolidation episode is characterized by
decreasing government spending - aimed at stimulating private demand - and raising
marginal taxes - in order to adjust the government debt-stabilizing public finances.
Hence, Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011) suggested that the standard method
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adopted to measure the effects of fiscal consolidation (variations in cyclically ad-
justed balance) is not truly suitable, since it does indicate evidence in favour of the
expansionary austerity hypothesis, which is implausible (according to them). A new
measure should instead replace changes in cyclically adjusted balance, in favour of
only exogenous variations, found through an action based or narrative approach.
The reason why the statistical measure of variations in cyclically adjusted balance
could be a biased estimate of the effects of fiscal consolidation, is its likely correlation
with factors affecting output. In this sense, ∆CAB might embrace components
which are endogenous towards gross domestic product’s growth. The direction of
the bias would be upward, according to Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011), as
exemplified by the case of Ireland in 2009. An empirical testing of the two measures’
consistency performed by the same authors, clearly shows a superiority of the action
based approach.
In the same direction, De Vries, Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori (2011) compiled a
new action-based dataset with variables related to fiscal consolidation for 17 OECD
countries, according to the criteria that only exogenous fiscal shocks should be in-
cluded in a relevant series. Exogenous, in this context, represents an attribute of the
only shocks which are not correlated with output growth (e.g. a tax increase aimed
at reducing government debt) and are allowed to be properly considered shocks, in
an analogous fashion as intented in Romer and Romer (2010).
Such a new dataset has been employed by Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2012)
to estimate the multipliers related to both tax based and spending based fiscal con-
solidation episodes. In particular, the authors analyzed the effects on output of
these “multi-period policy mixes”, composed of increases in revenues as well as cuts
in government spending. Indeed, according to them, it is hardly likely that sin-
gle measures are, for instance, adopted in isolation, thus there should be room for
different "styles" in fiscal consolidation across countries. They found, with both
anticipated and unanticipated shocks, that fiscal consolidations based on spending
cuts are less recessionary than those based on tax hikes, the reason not being the
role of accompanying policies, rather the business confidence and private investment
reactions.
Another relevant article on the issue is Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2011), which
suggests that the size of the expenditure multiplier might easily vary across countries,
according to their degree of development, to whether they adopt a peg exchange rate,
the extent to which they are prone to protectionism, and the size of indebtedness
of their government. Their main finding is that the magnitude of the multipliers is
higher for countries that are industrialized, that have a fixed exchange rate, a closed
economy, and a low public sector debt.
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Finally, perhaps the most crucial article with respect to our analysis, is the work
by Romer and Romer (2010) for the US, followed by that of Cloyne (2011) for the UK.
These two studies have both relied on a new measure of fiscal shocks which, as already
mentioned, is based on the so called "narrative approach". Its core is the study of
the narrative records, namely institutional documents such as the Budget Reports,
Economic Speeches of the President, and well as Congressional Reports, employed
to understand whether a specific tax reform was adopted for reasons connected with
the business fluctuations, such as the willingness to counteract negative demand
shocks, or in response to more structural reasons. The two main justifications for
qualifying a change as "exogenous", are the intentions to improve long run growth or
to reduce government debt. Only these two kinds of declared reasons can significantly
underlie a fiscal shock enabling the researcher to consistently estimate the effects of
tax changes on output growth (without being correlated with standard errors in the
regression). Based on this analysis, Romer and Romer (2010) estimated the effect
of tax changes on GDP growth obtaining a much larger tax multiplier compared
to the conventional ones, amounting to -3 after twelve quarters. A similar finding
characterized the study of Cloyne (2010), with an estimate of -2.5 over the same time
span.
While for countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom analyzed
by the two previously cited contributions, there exists a well established tradition of
keeping track of public administrative actions, the same does not hold for most of
the continental and Southern European countries.
A relevant initial difficulty was faced, due to the high fractionalization of the
legislated tax changes typical of our countries’ sample. For such Mediterranean
nations, indeed, there exists a wide number of provisions in the financial laws, relative
to welfare oriented tasks, whose classification as exogenous or endogenous is often
controversial. In the anglo-saxon countries (mainly US and UK) such a problem is
present at a lower extent, making their narrative fiscal analysis more easily applicable.
3 Narrative Analysis
The present section represents the core of the process for obtaining "narrative mea-
sures" as introduced by Romer and Romer (2010). The starting point is the set
of discretionary tax measures legislated by five EU countries’ parliaments, namely
France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. These data, provided by each member
state’s Finance Ministry to the European Commission, contain the projected impact
of tax changes on government revenues (they are ex-ante estimates). This informa-
tion is used, together with official documents, in order to assess the reasons under-
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lying each tax change. For all these five European countries, governments present
the project for the prospective year’s "financial law" to the respective parliaments,
generally in September, so that the latter may vote a final version by the end of
December. That law establishes some budgetary provisions whose nature is binding
for all the public administrations. Hence indications on both the maximum size of
the disposable expenses for each ministry and administrative unit, or the issuing of
new rules for the collection of taxes (new tributes, or adjustments to old ones) are
expressed.
For Italy, the content of these financial laws is explored, while for France, the
speeches of the Budget Ministers towards the two Chambers are analyzed. With
regards to the other three countries, the analysis is based on the discretionary tax
measures’ description, which are pretty accurate, of the motivations underlying fiscal
variations on each EC file. If, during year t, the parliament of country i issues a tax
cut, motivated by the willingness to restore consumers’ demand at the pre-slack
period, that measure should be deemed "endogenous", because correlated with the
contingent economic conditions. In such a case, that specific measure is not be
included in our set of data.
Four categories could be distinguished in order to frame the legislated tax changes:
two are "endogenous", and two "exogenous" with regards to output growth. Firstly,
we identify those variations that are clearly preceded by a discussion to counterbal-
ance a specific episode, such as a negative shock to the economy. These are likely
to bring output to normal levels. A second category, is composed by those measures
which are intended to balance the expansionary effects of government expenses (i.e.
health or educational programs, in most cases).
Turning to the exogenous measures, a typical one, as Romer and Romer (2010)
point out, "might be a tax cut motivated by a belief that lower marginal tax rates
will raise output in the long run". In other cases, the willingness to raise taxes is
meant to "deal with inherited budget deficit" or respond to ideological reasons. For
example, policymakers might introduce a deduction allowing families to reduce fiscal
pressure: in that case a redistributive goal is motivating a tax change. Considering
debt reductions, European countries forming the Euro Area have been subject to the
provisions contained earlier in the Maastricht Treaty, and later in the Stability and
Growth Pact. They were required to keep debt
GDP
≤ 60%, deficit
GDP
≤ 3%, and to further
control the fluctuations of exchange rates, inflation as well as long term interest rates.
The measures connected with these reasons can largely be considered "exogenous".
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3.1 Italy
The date indicated in each law is referred to the provisions established for the
prospective year. Hence each law dated year t is obviously containing the tax mea-
sures applying in year t+ 1. The analysis spans within the decade 2001 - 2012.
3.1.1 Law no. 388, 23rd of December 20005
The main measures approved for the forthcoming year were: i. a reshaping in the
design of income brackets (18, 24, 32, 39, 45 percent), as well as the institution of
some new detractions and deductions, both aimed at reducing the tax pressure on
families (these measures are likely to be "exogenous"). ii. With regards to Imposta
sul Reddito delle Persone Giuridiche (IRPEG)6, its rate marginally decreased from
37 to 36%. In addition, a more rapid payback period was allowed for long term
investments, in order to promote firms’ higher capitalization. The balance sheet loss
of one fiscal period could be deduced from the subsequent 5 years’ profits (the three
measures just described might be deemed "exogenous"). iii. The tax credit for sub-
jects receiving a dividend’s share decreased from 58.73 to 56.25% (we deem all these
as "endogenous", since they are plausibly connected with asset prices fluctuations).
iv. Capital gains arising from sales of participation in firms listed on the stock ex-
change were subject to taxation for solely 80.56% of their value ("endogenous", for
the same reason as the previous measure). v. Individual entrepreneurs’ income is
calculated as part of Imposta sul Reddito delle Persone Fisiche (IRPEF)7. The same
holds for the so called "società di persone"8 ("exogenous"). vi. A withholding tax
amounting to 20% of their income is retained for subjects practicing a liberal art or
profession within the first two years of activity (it is "exogenous", not being linked
to any short term objective). vii. Tax base for Imposta Regionale sulle Attività
Produttive (IRAP)9 does not include scholarships granted by regions ("exogenous"
because inspired to equality principles). viii. Lump-sum taxes on biodiesel were
reduced, as well as on oil, GPL, and methane ("endogenous" since mainly connected
to oil price fluctuations). ix. Measures established by the European Commission are
imposing balance sheet rules for universities and research institutions (here the clas-
5http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/00388l.htm
6E.g.: the corporate income tax.
7Equivalent to the household income tax.
8In the Italian legal system, personal companies’ members are fully liable from the company’s
debts. The contrary holds for the so-called capital companies, where unlimited liability holds.
9Complementary to the corporate income tax, but characterized by a lower rate and a higher
base.
7
sification is a bit controversial, but here it is considered "exogenous", being part of
a European structural integration framework). x. Lastly, an increase in Imposta sul
Valore Aggiunto (IVA)10 on motorbikes and scooters sales is set, as well as auction
sales, and a re-design in tariffs, public prices, and local taxes, "endogenous".
3.1.2 Law no. 448, 28th of December 200111
i. IRPEF discipline changed; deductions for advertising costs - 20% - were conceded
to pharmaceutical firms launching new medicines (ideological reasons, "exogenous").
ii. Enterprise fixed assets’ revaluation heightened the base for the regional produc-
tivity tax. Land-offices’ annuity was revisited through some new parameters (both
related to long-run reasons: "exogenous"). iii. For real estate sales subject to IVA,
30% of the tribute itself should be due as tax substitute, "endogenous". iv. With
regards to lands available for construction, revaluations were subject to a tax sub-
stitute amounting to 4% of the higher value, "endogenous". v. Municipal tax on
real estate’s revaluation was suppressed, Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili (ICI, "en-
dogenous" change). vi. A detraction is allowed for reconstruction works of historical
buildings equal to 36% of the property, to be spread over a 10 years’ span. The same
holds for artistic restoring as well as conservative interventions. Moreover some mea-
sures on environmental protection of forests and wilds were adopted, "exogenous".
vii. Lump-sum tax rates on petrol’s products were decreased, "endogenous".
3.1.3 Law no. 289, 27th of December 200212
i. Personal tax pressure was reduced through a Euro 3,000 deduction, for guarantee-
ing a progressive fiscal system. Euro 1,500 are deductible as well, in case the total
earning was generated by more than one income source. A new income brackets’
design was established (23, 29, 31, 39, 45 percent). These household income taxes’
are deemed "exogenous" since they appear to be linked to a set of redistributive
reasons. ii. A "no-tax area" is fixed below the 7,500 threshold (for both earnings or
pensions). Detractions were conceded only within the upper bound of 52,000 income.
Property rights’ owners were allowed a detraction spreadable on a three to five years’
span. It should be reminded that monetary transition from Lira to the European
Currency Unit took place this year. Purchasing costs for real estate destined to the
medical profession’s exercise were not deductible (these measures are to be consid-
10Analogous to value added tax.
11http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/01448l.htm
12http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/02289l.htm
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ered "exogenous"). iii. IRES13 rate was decreased from 35 to 34%, "endogenous".
iv. IRAP was to be redefined after reaching an agreement on the issue of fiscal
federalism (articles 118 - 119, Title V of the Constitution). This issue was especially
delicate, since it deals with interregional tax income distribution, relatedly with the
North-South inequality as well as some secessionist instances ("exogenous", because
related to ideological reasons). v. Corporate tax credit was reduced, from 53.85
to 51.51%, "exogenous". vi. Increased deductions for IRAP, in particular about
transport costs, insurance for injured at workplace, trainees’ costs, etc. were set,
"endogenous". vii. Registrar’s duties were slightly raised. Methodologies adopted
for quantifying the income are based on the value added data. A new norm set-
ting parameters for fiscal litigations was proposed, "endogenus". viii. An offshore
disclosure facility was issued with a rate equal to 4% of the value of the financial
activities held abroad by a resident subject (controversial classification, since even if
implemented with the aim of bringing back some hidden capitals, it might just have
some short run effects, nonetheless we deem it "exogenous").
3.1.4 Law no. 350, 24th of December 200314
i. Personal withholding tax was decreased from 19 to 12%, and that of 15 was
reduced to 9%, and payable within three years, staring from 2004, without inter-
ests, "endogenous". ii. Agricultural activities were made freer from taxes over the
value added (-50%), "exogenous". iii. Cultural institutes were favored with a tax
credit amounting to 100,000, in order to promote the creation of their headquarters,
"exogenous". iv. Lump-sum taxes on alcoholic goods were diminished to 1.59 per
hectoliter, while for intermediate products it was adjusted till 57.15 per hectoliter;
lastly for ethyl alcohol the lump sum tax rate equalled 730,87 per hectoliter, "en-
dogenous". v. Reduced IVA rate (4%) was set for medicines aimed at first aid cures
(debatable categorization, perhaps endogenous to favor pharmaceutical industries,
or exogenous for being inspired to first aid help humanitarian needs).
3.1.5 Law no. 311, 30th of December 200415
i. The DPEF 16 established a variation in the public revenues destination different
than the 2% of those fixed for the previous year. This was true with the excep-
13Reformed corporate income tax, in place of IRPEG.
14http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/03350l.htm
15http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/04311l.htm
16Documento di Programmazione Economica e Finanziaria.
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tion of interests on government bonds 17, social transfers connected with subjective
rights as well as from communitarian funds, "exogenous". ii. Spending ceilings
were introduced for mountainous communities as well as for provinces and regions,
as regulated by the Ministry of Finances, "endogenous". A special fund amount-
ing to 7,500 millions could be employed. Another special fund was established by
the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture in order to promote investments in related
infrastructures. An empowerment program for the seaside highways was launched
with transportation easing objective, presumably to improve long run growth. New
family deductions were adopted: 3,200 for the non legally separated spouse; 2,900
per child; 3,450 for children younger than three years; 3,200 for each child with a
missing parent; 3,700 for disabled persons. Also, an updated income tax brackets’
design was drawn in order to reduce the income inequalities across households. Pro-
posal for fiscal planning was launched towards professionals and corporate income
perceivers. iii. As last an impulse to tax elusion/evasion was prompted (certainly
"exogenous" because inspired to beliefs about fairness).
3.1.6 Law no. 266, 23rd of December 200518
The higher amounts coming from the liquidation of estates that were part of the
State’s property were to be destined to the reduction of public debt (not classifi-
able since it is not a fiscal revenue). i. Lump-sum taxes were resized to 256.70 per
1,000 liters on stabilized emulsions, "endogenous". ii. 5 per 1,000 on IRPEF was
devoted to some third sector’s activities such as volunteering organizations, scientific
or medical research, municipal social activities, "exogenous". Moreover some agree-
ment of cooperation were established with some research centers located in North
America. iii. A new corporate tax was settled: IRES, in place of IRPEG (struc-
tural measure, thus "exogenous"). A fiscal, financial, administrative disburdenment
was grantable for investments in research and development. iv. Individuals per-
ceiving an autonomous work earning as well as those obtaining dividend yields from
business activities were subject to an additional personal income tax equal to 25%,
"exogenous". v. Enterprise fixed assets’ revaluations were disburdened by a tax
substitute of 12% and 6% respectively on depreciable and non-depreciable activities,
"endogenous". vi. Internal liberalization of electric energy market was issued ac-
cording to a European directive, "exogenous". vii. Lotteries’ tax rate increased to
8% ≤ τg ≤ 12%, "endogenous".
17Buoni sulle Obbligazioni del Tesoro.
18http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/05266l.htm
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3.1.7 Law no. 296, 27th of December 200619
Firstly targeted objectives were to reduce the fiscal pressure as well as fight tax
evasion, in order to pursue social equality and development. i. Deductions were
suppressed, and new income tax brackets were fixed (23, 27, 38, 41, 43 percent).
Detractions were set for familial expenses such as for a non legally separated spouse,
for each son, particularly if subject to a handicap, or is younger than 3 (aiming at
guaranteeing the fiscal system is still progressive: "exogenous"). ii. A regional tax on
automobile - oil consumption was defined, amounting to Euro.00266/.00288/.00307
per liter for 2007/’08/’09 (connected with oil price fluctuations: "endogenous").
iii. Health expenses were deductible when proved by fiscal receipts. Higher public
incomes for the prospective year were added to the Political Economy Structural
Interventions ("exogenous" since it is inspired by welfare oriented reasons).
3.1.8 Law no. 244, 24th of December 200720
i. Detractions were conceded upon real estate tax. Moreover, households opting for
setting solar energy systems might obtain a 4% discount spreadable over a three years
period. Detractions were also set for the renters of students older than 20 and younger
than 30. These three measures are to be deemed "exogenous", since they deal with
reasons such as the promotion of renewable energy, the easing for the tax on house
of residence, as well as some students’ allowances. ii. Fiscal lightnening on housing
constructions were postponed until years 2008 and 2009. Land’s rent with value lower
than 500 was exempted by any kind of taxation ("exogenous", for the same reasons
as the previous changes). iii. A household with at least four children may benefit
from a detraction amounting to 1,200, "exogenous". iv. Personal companies could
detract the negative profits from the taxable income during the five subsequent years,
"endogenous". v. Negative interests payment was deductible from gross earnings
within the 30% bound - starting from the third tax period after 2007 ("endogenous",
since it is likely to be a countercyclical measure). vi. Subjects incurring in a financial
leasing had the right to implement an accelerated depreciation, and each endowment
is deductible from the tax base, "endogenous". vii. Brand expenses were also
deductible (we deem this as "endogenous"). viii. 84% of the capital gains obtained
from participations in listed companies is exempted. The others were taxed at the
rate of 27.5%. For groups of companies, an obligation of global profits imposition
holds, if produced by controlled foreign companies, "exogenous". ix. In case of
factories’ sales, a tax withholding amounting to 12, 14, or 16% was issued, according
19http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/06296l.htm
20http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/07244l.pdf
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to whether the value of the assets was lower than 5m, between 5 and 10m, or higher
than 10m euros, "endogenous". x. A higher detraction for travel agents was set, with
the aim of preventing their Internet-caused decline; more broadly, IRAP’s tax base
was reduced on the labour costs ("exogenous", since related to the fundamentals
of that regional tribute). xi. A blacklist on worldwide tax havens was published
by the Ministry of Finances, in order to discriminate among account holders is such
states21 (linked to ideological reasons, hence "exogenous"). xii. Teachers of all levels
of public schools are granted with a 500 detraction for expenses due to self-education
courses, "exogenous" as well.
3.1.9 Law no. 203, 22nd of December 200822
i. Additional regional tax rate equals 1.9%, not holding over common investment
funds, nor GEIE 23, nor pension funds, "endogenous". ii. The 500 detraction for
teachers of public schools for expenses of self-updating and education was postponed
(naturally "exogenous", despite the beginning of the crisis might make it "endoge-
nous"; still educational measures are likely to be related to long term growth objec-
tives). iii. Also, a detraction was established for local public transport expenses,
"endogenous". iv. A favorable treatment was reserved for agricultural properties, as
well as for lump-sum taxes on oil within local mountainous municipalities ("endoge-
nous" because related to the agricultural items’ price fluctuations). v. A tax credit
for automobiles’ purchases was issued during 2009, if the weight of the car is lower
tan 7.5 tons, and was committed by entrepreneurial organizations ("endogenous",
with the aim of sustaining private demand).
3.1.10 Law no. 191, 23rd of December 200924
Higher public finance availabilities were employed to stimulate the decreased de-
mand, as a consequence of the financial crisis. Highly targeted subjects were: (a)
families with children; (b) labour income workers; (c) retired workers; (d) all the
employed. i. Contributions to pensions by agricultural workers were determined
on their average salary within the different categories belonging to collective agree-
ments, "endogenous". ii. As an exceptional measure, IRAP’s rate was raised by
21Except for those professionals who were domiciled within an EU country.
22http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/08203l.htm
23Gruppi Europei di Interesse Economico are a juridical institution identifying groups of firms
with European geographical relevance.
24http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/09191l.pdf
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0.15%, and IRPEF’s by 0.30% ("endogenous", since motivated by the economy’s
contingent conditions).
3.1.11 Law no. 220, 13th of December 201025
Labeled as "Stability Law", it was formed by a single article with various provisions.
Briefly, it established i. a fiscal reform based on easing; an exemptions regime;
social security strengthening amounting to 1.5 million ("endogenous", because all
related to short term objectives); ii. an "eco-bonus"; university funds’ institution;
nuclear energy promotion ("exogenous"). iii. For financial leasing contracted during
a real estate’s purchase, it was newly stated that both the debtor and the leasing
firm are obliged to pay the purchasing registry tribute ("exogenous", motivated by
long run reasons). iv. In order to stimulate academic research, a tax credit was
accorded to firms which opted for externalizing their own R&D department in favor
of public universities ("exogenous", ideologically motivated). v. Tax facilities were
conceded to employees with income lower than 40,000, "exogenous". All forms of
unemployment benefits were kept intact through a state guarantee.
3.1.12 Law no. 183, 12th of November 201126
i. One of the main objectives was to reduce the imbalance among debt-financed
firms and equity-sustained ones. A deduction was indeed conceded to the latter.
This measure is to be considered "exogenous". ii. Some tax easing was accorded to
labour cost as well as to young and female workers (ideological, hence "exogenous").
iii. Expenses aimed at a energy-reducing house improvements can be detracted
from gross income (to be deemed "exogenous"). iv. A new municipal tribute was
instituted, namely Imposta Municipale sugli Immobili (IMU27), holding until 2015,
whose tax base was the property’s value, according to the housing registry office.
Its standard rate was 0.76%, which can be augmented or decreased by the majors
within a +/-0.3% band (motivated by need to reduce previously accumulated deficit,
"exogenous"). v. Another local tribute was instituted, on urban waste collection,
25http://www.agenziaentrate.gov.it/wps/file/Nsilib/Nsi/Documentazione/Archivio/
Normativa+fiscale+principale/Legge+di+stabilita+2011/Legge+di+stabilita+2011/
legge+stabilita+2011.pdf
26The present financial law (aimed at "stability and growth") has been written by a new technical
government headed by Mario Monti. http://www.agenziaentrate.gov.it/wps/file/Nsilib/
Nsi/Documentazione/Archivio/Normativa+fiscale+principale/Legge+di+stabilita+2012/
Legge+di+stabilita+2012/legge_stabilita_2012.pdf
27Definable as a real estate’s municipal tax.
13
"exogenous". vi. Lump sum tax rates on oil were fixed in 0.7042/liter for petrol,
in Euros 0.26777/liter for gas of liquified petrol, in 0.00331/m3 for trucks’ natural
gas, "endogenous". xii. Moreover luxury cars, yachts, aircrafts and helicopters were
heavily taxed ("exogenous" aimed at keeping a steeply progressive tax system). xiii.
IVA’s rate was augmented till 21% of value added, "exogenous".
3.2 France
Speeches introducing organic financial laws are studied. Organic laws are subject to
slight variations, at the end of the year, through a final transitory law, which takes
into account the most recent cyclical developments. Here, extracts extracts from the
parliamentary speeches are presented.
3.2.1 Discours sur le projét de loi des finances pour le 200128
The government’s project foresaw a manoeuvre with value equal to BnF186 (28.4bn).
A plan for fiscal reduction was launched which should operate on VAT, household
income taxation as well as on corporate one ("exogenous", being a multi year plan).
Moreover, a priority was set on the battle for job vacancies creation. Growth forecast
for 2001 is higher than 3.2%. Deficit is amounting to 1.2% of GDP. Some F50bn
reductions are established as supplementaries, such as a -1% of value added tax and
the suppression of the regional component of the housing tax, "endogenous". This
three year tax reduction plan establishes a total reduction of F100bn equivalent to
Bn15.229. Finally, the Kyoto Treaty on pollutant emissions imposed a reduction of
energetic expenses in France.
3.2.2 Discours sur le projét de loi de finances pour le 200230
The budget hypothesized that growth for 2002 will set around around 2.3%. The
three main issues for the Euro area countries, this year would be stability if eco-
nomic structures, making labour markets more dynamic, and keeping proper bud-
getary policies. Price stability should be carefully ensured, in France inflation grew
only 0.1% during the last five moths. Household consumption augmented by 1.7%
28http://www.alain-lambert.org/wp-content/uploads/senat/pdf/
12-12-00-discours-plf-01-vote-final.pdf
29Franc to Euro exchange rate for that year was 6.559:1.
30http://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/sites/performance_publique/
files/farandole/ressources/archives/2002/PLF/fp0112131.htm
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2001:3. Risks mining the desirable growth consolidation were of financial, or psycho-
logical nature, or connected to oil price fluctuations. Government’s plan for ensuring
sustainable growth was achieved through employment’s preservation, business invest-
ment’s stimulus, reinforcement of public intervention in favour of small and medium
enterprises.
"Les mesures fiscales portent principalement la marque de consolida-
tion de la croissance [...]. i. Amortissement special pour les entreprises
jusqu’au 2002 (30 mois) sur l’investissement dans les bien d’équipement
sont assurés. ii. 1.22Md d’euro d’argent en mois ne viendront collecté
par la TVA. iii. Les entreprises d’assurance beneficieront des dispositions
fiscales ameliorées (aprés l’11 de Septembre). Il faudra aussi garantir la
neutralité du passage á l’euro."
Madame Parly, Sécretaire d’État au Budget
No new specific measure was taken for this year, except for those already issued
in the three years plan legislated in 2001.
3.2.3 Discours sur le projét de loi des finances pour le 200331
The law project for 2003 was based on transparency, respect of duties in favour of
employees, growth, and fiscal federalism. An increase in tax revenues amounting to
700m, due to a new forecast, was estimated for the year 2003. As a consequence,
the government proposes to cut taxes for the correspondent amount. Concretely, the
main planned measures were concerned i. with labour income imposition of a 1bn
decrease; ii. and professional income tax was lightened of a 2.7bn reduction. In total,
a rounded amount of 3.8bn in public taxes is withdrawn. The aim of such measures
is not only related with reducing tax wedge, but also with favouring enterprises to
improve general employment, and thus restoring the country’s competitiveness (both
"exogenous", because structural).
3.2.4 Discours sur le projét de loi des finances pour le 200432
The aim of this year’s financial law was to simplify imposition, through the i. refor-
mation of the distributive fiscal regime ("exogenous", related to ideological reasons);
ii. the reduction in dividends’ taxation ("endogenous", because connected to current
31http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/033000066.html
32https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000612133&
dateTexte=&categorieLien=id
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economic developments); iii. and the creation of a shareholders’ tax credit, "endoge-
nous". In addition to that, iv. real estate’s up-valuations regime was simplified; the
same is true for land’s agricultural exploitation, as well as for formalities related to
tiny hereditary successions. Other relevant measures are going to be briefly summa-
rized: v. a Popular Pensions’ Saving plan is formulated ("exogenous", structural);
vi. employees’ taxation is lightened; a tax credit is granted for domestic expenses
within the principal residence; anticipated patrimony transmission is issued for young
generations (welfare oriented, "exogenous"); vii. tax credits are conceded to those
enterprises which favour a proper conciliation between work and leisure times (ide-
ologically motivated, "exogenous"). vii. Excise on oil is adjusted, "endogenous".
In total, the fiscal mitigation amounts to 2.5bn, which reach the peak of 3.3bn if
additional fiscal benefits arising from other legislative sources are considered. State’s
budget choices were inspired this year by the idea expressed by Mr. Alain Lambert:
"Doter la France d’un État efficace et performante. Un bon budget n’est pas un bud-
get qui augmente!". A final task faced by the financial law of 2003 for 2004 was the
reform of tariffs, public prices, university fees, "endogenous".
3.2.5 Loi des finances pour le 200533
The finance minister Hervé Gaymard, member of a right-wing government, during a
speech in front of the National Assembly (lower chamber), declared that private con-
sumption in France in 2004 was the second highest in Europe, with a consumption
growth forecast of about 2%. Industrial investments for the same year is +5%. The
main financial risks were connected to dollar devaluations towards euro, and to the
oil price fluctuations. He stated that "La croissance n’est pas seulement exogene, il
faut la chercher". A higher ground for minimum wage is established. i. Measures
in favour of donations are set (is ideologically motivated, thus "endogenous"). ii.
Both professional and corporate income tax were decreased (short run measure: "en-
dogenous"). iii. Furthermore, social security system was reformed for the benefit of
youngest, eldest and less qualified subjects on the job market (+2bn), "exogenous".
In conclusion, the main political economic objectives were a. reconciling growth sus-
tainability and public finance consolidation; b. making employment more flexible;
c. prioritizing, within competition policy, research and development’s promotion.
33https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000789373&
dateTexte=&categorieLien=id
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3.2.6 Loi des finances pour le 200634
This year’s financial law did not contain any ambitious social reform - related provi-
sion. Supervision for "excessive deficit procedure" started for France by initiative of
the EC. i. A slight reduction in personal income tax was introduced, as well as ii.
on enterprises’ profit (the formed might be deemed "exogenous", contrarily to the
latter, which appears more like to operate in the short term).
3.2.7 “Loi des finances pour le 2007”35
According to the contents of such a law, government expenditures were to be de-
creased; total taxes’ reductions amounted to 6bn. i. A higher revenue of 0.8bn is
originated by targeted measures. The deficit has been reduced by about 5bn in 2007,
complying with the Stability and Growth Pact’s prescriptions. Government debt was
instead setting on 63.6% of GDP. Broadly speaking, the general orientation was to
further lessen the annual deficit, within the prospective four years. The government
effort to finance sectors such as public security, justice, technological development,
university education was also to be deemed relevant.
3.2.8 Loi des finances pour le 200836
Eric Woerth, Ministry of Budget and State’s Reform, stated that the objectives for
the forthcoming year were: reinforcing growth, to be achieved through public finance
adjustment, lowering fiscal pressure and monitoring public expenses. Concretely,
these goals are pursued through i. reducing professionals income tax, as well as ii.
reducing imposition on dividend yields and capital gains.
3.2.9 Loi des finances pour le 200937
An ambitious aim was set for 2009: bringing public finances towards a balanced
path by 2012, reachable with a 0.5% yearly decrease of deficit to GDP. In order to
attain such an objective, government expenses had to be kept under control; i. as
for social security contributions, health insurance must be readdressed by 4 to 5bn
34http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/pdf/projets/pl2540.pdf
35https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000615000&
dateTexte=&categorieLien=id
36https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000017853368&
dateTexte=&categorieLien=id
37https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000019995721&
dateTexte=&categorieLien=id
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by 2011, "exogenous"; structural reforms with a positive impact on growth ought
to be promoted. ii. Old age pensions were indexed to inflation, to counterbalance
the negative effects of 2008, due to inflation, "endogenous". A constitutional reform
opened a window on the possibility to insert in the fundamental chart a provision
about public finance’s equilibrium.
3.2.10 Loi des finances pour le 201038
The crisis’ challenge had been successfully tackled in 2009. Consumption was prop-
erly sustained, investment too, thanks to subsidies conceded to small and medium
enterprises, banking bailouts were properly faced, according to E.Woerth, Budget
Minister. Nevertheless the deficit is still high, equivalent to 8.2 points of GDP. i.
Income tax on enterprises decreased by a very significant amount, 10bn. ii. 4.1bn
of tax credits would be employed as a recovery measure. The general government
orientation was directed towards a reduction of the fiscal pressure, being France yet
the fifth country in the global ranking for higher taxes. Hence, as far as stimulus to
economy was concerned, iii. professional income tax as well as corporate one would
both be decreased.
3.2.11 Loi des finances pour le 201139
Household revenues tax was increased as well as social security contributions. An
austerity plan was set in order to contrast the sovereign debt crisis, affecting countries
of the Euro area. i. A first measure was an increase in indirect tax on tobacco
products. ii. Professional income tax was raised marginally, and iii. corporate
income tax rules were modified towards a harmonization with the German system.
iv. Social "forfait" rate was increased from 6% to 8%. Finally, v. real estate surplus’
higher imposition would account for most of the fiscal revenues for this year.
3.2.12 Loi des finances pour le 201240
"The French budget has been in deficit since 1975 and it should slowly
be reduced till zero as long as 2016 approaches. Budgetary discipline is
38https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000021557902
39https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023314376&
categorieLien=id
40https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000025044460&
categorieLien=id
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not a matter of technicalities neither of political nature, it is just a matter
of moral and national responsibility."
Budget Ministry V. Precresse
In order to achieve that objective, government expenses should be lightened. For
the first time since 1945, expenditures will be reduced in 2012, and some public
administration employees are going to be fired. Turning to the prospective fiscal
changes, i. a 3% special contribution on high income earners (250,000-500,000), 4%
if above that bound ("exogenous", being equality oriented). ii. Fiscal niches are
reduced (having a plausible effect in the long run, thus "exogenous"); iii. a special
excise tax on soft drinks is set, "endogenous"; iv. tax on energetic improvements
(solar panels and thermal isolation) is going to be decreased to zero by 2015, "ex-
ogenous". As a rectification, v. extraordinary working hours’ exemption is going to
stopped, "endogenous"; and vi. the products subject to the lowest VAT are to be
taxed heavier from 5.5% to 7% - except for food items and books ("endogenous",
being motivated by the need to counterbalance the current crisis). vii. A tax on
wealth is established, "exogenous".
3.3 Spain, Portugal, and Greece
In the case of these three Mediterranean countries included in our study, instead of
analyzing the content of the financial laws or their presentation speeches, a deeper
piece of information contained on the EC’s files with discretionary tax measures of
member states was exploited. In these files, indeed, descriptions of the fiscal changes
were presented in a more accurate manner. Hence, it was possible distinguishing
thanks to that information source, between measures adopted with the intention to
respond to the business cycle and others taken for long run reasons.
4 Data
Raw data on discretionary tax measures were collected during a traineeship at the
European Commission, DG - Ecfin, in the Unit C1 of Fiscal Policy and Surveillance
in spring 2012. As already mentioned, the data on discretionary measures have been
skimmed according to the Romer and Romer (2010)’s criterion: classifying each tax
shock on the basis of the underlying motivation, in order to construct a "narrative"
dataset of fiscal shocks.
The series of all legislated tax changes is not particularly long in time (2001-2013,
for Greece only since 2005 onwards), contrarily to that of Romer and Romer (2010)
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for the US and Cloyne’s (2011) for the UK. Hence, our data are not time-series, rather
a panel for five European countries: Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece, whose
choice was motivated by the fact that they are those which suffered the most from
the intensity of the financial crisis of 2008-2011 (except France, perhaps).
The process which leads to the creation of an exogenous dataset of tax shocks,
began by applying a sort of “narrative analysis” to the raw data. Financial laws for
Italy and France are analyzed so to attempt a detection between two main categories
of tax policy changes on the basis of their underlying motivation. The quantification
and attribution of their foreseen impact on GDP growth, reduction in government
debt as well as on their ability to counteract the cycle (recession) has been done in a
“heuristic way”. For Greece, Portugal and Spain, such a disentanglement exercise was
performed through the imputation voices of the difference in government revenues
for, e.g., an inncrease of two percent in the excise tax on tobacco or on petroleum
sales or on a given type of value added tax present on the Microsoft Excel files
compiled by the finance ministries personnel. In this manner, a relative weight to
each shock has been assigned, allowing to include portions of them and exclude the
remaining partof the projected government revenues.
The choice regarding independent variables has been to obtain the most disag-
gregated possible level of analysis, elaborating variables for personal income tax,
corporate income tax, value added tax, social security contributions, instead of, say,
simply direct taxes on the one side and indirect taxes on the other. Other vari-
ables comprised in the data-set are gross domestic product at current prices, private
consumption at currents prices, gross fixed capital formation for the private sector,
labeled as private investment, total unemployment for all sectors (excluded public
sector), and government debt to GDP ratio, extracted from the Ameco database
(EUROSTAT).
In order to obtain a measure of real output growth, such a transformation was
performed: ∆Yt =
(
Yt−Yt−1
Yt−1
)
. An analogous operation has been carried out for the
other four independent variables, which will be used to elaborate some extensions
of the baseline results. Their inclusion will permit one to obtain an estimate of the
effects of tax reforms not solely on real GDP growth, but also on private consumption,
private investment, unemployment, government debt to GDP’s growth.
Fiscal shocks are originally expressed in billions of euros, but for the purpose of
the analysis, they have been divided for real GDP. Moreover, purporting the need to
have an idea of a global effect of tax changes, and not just of any single component,
we aggregated the three main categories - pit, cit, vat 41. In so doing, we added
41Meaning, clearly, personal income tax, corporate income tax, and value added tax
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them together, premultiplied by their relative weight, i.e.: pertax =
∑
i αi(T
s
it)/Yt,
where αi = T¯i∑ T¯i .
The data are described at a yearly frequency. The fact that they are not quarterly
should not undermine the analysis, since this is not a VAR model, requiring as an
orthogonality condition the data to be frequent. Rather, with a simple OLS and
a fixed effects regression, it is only necessary for the independent variable to be
uncorrelated with the error term. Purpose which should have been achieved through
the narrative analysis.
4.1 Properties of Exogenous Tax Changes
Before running any kind of regressions, it is deemed relevant to briefly describe
the data. Firstly, they are in real values, billions of euros, even if in the following
regressions, they will be expressed in ratio with GDP. The means of corporate income
taxes over the five countries in our time sample is -.279, with a standard deviation
of 2.023. With regards to personal income taxation, the mean is negative, -.554, and
a standard deviation amounting to 2.168. Value added tax, as well as social security
contributions are lower, their mean respectively reaching the values of -.060 and .135,
while the standard deviations are 1.308 and 1.373.
The situation in France is quite varied, since a noticeable fluctuation has been
registered in the past thirteen years, with cit being the most drawn downward
(2009). Nonetheless, cit was robustly diminished, particularly in 2001 and 2007,
to be augmented again in 2012 (after the victory of Mr. Hollande at the Elysee).
Finally, it should be remarked that ssc has been levied significantly across the whole
decade, with increases in 2004, 2006, 2012, and reductions in 2001, 2008.
This description is based on the graphs in appendix. Regarding Greece, the
most evident measure is the huge increase in indirect taxes - mainly vat - due to
the financial "bail-out" which took place in 2010. Afterwards, a financial support
promoted by EC and IMF deepened the need to increase taxes, such that some
journalists talked about "austerity trap". An insignificant reduction in cit in 2011
was not enough to cause growth.
Italian tax shocks are fluctuating across the decade, marked by an enterprise
income tax reform, promoted by Romano Prodi’s government, during years 2006
and 2007. vat was reduced along those year, and re-raised in 2009. pit was the
highest varying tax, reaching the minimum in 2001, within our time sample.
Portugal’s principal characteristics are an increase in vat in 2003, as well as a
relevant lowering of tax burden on enterprises, taking place in 2010. The tax pressure
on households has been strengthened since the beginning of the US subprime crises
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till nowadays, with a peak reached the last year.
The main facts about Spain are abundant tax cuts. pit was significantly de-
creased in 2003 and 2008, to be raised afterward in 2010. Conversely, vat was
reduced in 2009. Anyway, the recently approved fiscal reform is more spending than
revenue-based.
4.2 Comparison with (all) Discretionary Tax Measures
Considering all discretionary tax measures involved having some broader measure of
fiscal variations. Turning towards summary statistics of these measures, we could
indicate that personal income tax shocks means amounts to -1.207 with a stan-
dard deviation of 4.283. Corporate income tax’s fiscal shocks mean is -.356 (2.930).
Value added tax’s average is .0045 (1.162) and social security contributions’ one
is .497 (3.974). The disaggregated effects for each single country are: for Greece,
means(pit) = .413; means(cit) = .261; means(vat) = .664; for Spain, means(pit)
= -1.167; means(cit) = -.817; means(vat) = -.262; for France, means(pit) = -1.120;
means(cit) = -.859; means(vat) = -.315; for Italy, means(pit) = -1.749; means(cit)
= .600; means(vat) = .077; for Portugal, means(pit) = .070; means(cit) = -.141;
means(vat) = .052.
5 Estimating the tax multiplier
5.1 Setting up
Armed with the new tax panel dataset for Southern European countries, the fiscal
multiplier through a simple linear regression accounting for space and time fixed
effects was estimated. Before setting up the model, the issue of endogeneity in fiscal
policy must be clarified, along with the framework proposed by Romer and Romer
(2010). Consider a simple equation describing how real output growth is affected by
tax reforms:
∆Yit = αi + β∆Tit + it (1)
where ∆Yit is real GDP growth for state i in year t, ∆Tit represents all discre-
tionary tax measures.
Various components are naturally likely to affect growth other than tax changes.
It is possible to imagine them ranging from monetary policy shocks to government
spending ones, from natural catastrophes to expectations about future prospects.
Hence, we might think of it as a mosaic made up of a variety of factors:
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it =
L∑
j=1
jit. (2)
Moreover, the jit are likely to be correlated with each others. A relation connect-
ing the forces lying behind tax changes is considered:
∆Tit =
L∑
j=1
gjit
j
it +
M∑
k=1
φkit, (3)
where it are those previously identified, and the φit are ulterior components of tax
policy. Equation (3) catches the fundamental fact that tax changes are not univocally
determined by a unique set of reasons, but by a variety of them. Government may
respond to factors likely to significantly affect output growth (i.e. the it), such as a
forthcoming recession, and lower taxes to balance it. Alternatively it could tighten
the fiscal pressure for financing the higher expenses required by a war. Nonetheless,
policymakers could just wish to reduce taxes with the idea that it will favour long-
run growth: this is described by the φit in equation (3). Furthermore the idea of two
kinds of reasons motivating tax changes (just one being exogenous towards output
growth) is formalized by assuming the absence of correlation between the it and the
φit.
Tax changes are discrete phenomena, responding to some particular event, and
such fact is captured by the interaction of the it with the git. The responses are
typical for every period, but not necessarily subsequently it are affected among
themselves (i.e. they are non stationary).
5.2 Combining taxes and output
Now, putting together the equations for taxes and for output, the following is ob-
tained:
∆Yit = αi + β
[ L∑
j=1
gjit
j
it +
M∑
k=1
φkit
]
+ it (4)
Writing in this way the equation for output demonstrates why a regression with
output growth as a dependent variable and all legislated tax changes as a regressor,
conducts to a biased estimate of the "tax multiplier": some changes are correlated
with this regression’s error term. Such a correlation may be even stronger if the
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measure of tax changes is assumed to be the conventional one, e.g. cyclically adjusted
revenues.
The effort to construct a series of fiscal shocks for some EU countries was specifi-
cally aimed at finding some proper φit to be filled in equation (4). We have been able
to employ narrative records to identify all significant legislated tax changes. Because
it is likely that there exists one single motivation behind each tax change, we are
able to identify each git, it and φit in the post Berlin Wall fall era.
Equation (4) can be reformulated in a way that places tax changes affected by
output shocks into the error term:
∆Yit = αi + β
M∑
k=1
φkit + vit, (5)
where vit =
∑L
j=1(1+βg
j
it)
j
it. If the φit have been correctly identified, the measure
of tax changes should be uncorrelated with the error term. A regression of output
growth on φit should yield an unbiased estimate of the effects of fiscal policy changes
on output. The φit in each year is our new measure of fiscal shocks.
5.3 Empirical strategy
In principle, a simple OLS could be run, in order to estimate the effect of tax changes
on output. Nonetheless, a fixed-effects estimator is subsequently used, in order to
consistently account for space unobserved heterogeneity, even if this heterogeneity
was correlated with one of the regressors. Formally, the result can be achieved
through four possible methodologies, namely first differences, deviations from the
means, orthogonal deviations, and dummy-variable estimator. The last one would
be adopted since it avoids any fancy transformation, to get rid of the unobserved
source of heterogeneity.
The dummy-variable estimator indeed, is not based on the GLS, which to be
estimated needs to be transformed into a "feasible GLS". Here, simply applying
OLS, thanks to a matrix of dummies for individual i, it is possible to estimate
the unobserved parameter accounting for the additional variability in the dependent
variable. Finally we should remind that STATA has a proper command for computing
the β of fixed-effects regression, which greatly simplifies our task.
Exploiting the temporal variability across individuals, it is possible to come-up
with a simple estimator of the effects of tax changes on output, in a dynamic setting,
exploiting time lags within different periods.
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5.4 Baseline results
Real output growth is regressed on our new measure of tax changes, at times t− 3,
t − 2, t − 1, for personal, corporate income, and value added taxes. We firstly run
an OLS, a fixed effect estimation afterwards. It is surprising to observe some so
highly positive coefficients for corporate income taxes with both the econometric
specifications, one period aback.
While the β for personal income tax and value added tax are quite negative (-
2.94 and -4.00 for OLS, -0.993 and -1.90 for fixed effects), but their t-statistics are
too low to be deemed significant, with corporate income tax, the coefficients sig-
nificantly jump till 6.51 and 7.45 respectively. The result of these regressions with
disaggregated tax shocks might be seen as worrying, since they could bring to a loss
of significance to the validity of our analysis. How possible is that a marginal in-
crease in taxes on enterprises will lead to an increase in output? Economic theory of
optimal taxation foresees that if tax rates are higher, it will be more costly for firms
to produce an additional unit of output. Hence, they will be discouraged to increase
their productivity, by raising salaries, encouraging consumption, and causing growth.
An interpretation could be that the aggregate supply elasticity to corporate taxes is
harshly low.
In order to find an estimate of the global effect of tax changes on output growth,
a lagged aggregate measure of tax changes is used a s a regressor, which we called
pertax42. An OLS regression, a robust regression, and a fixed effect estimation is
then performed. The results obtained for the first one, are a point estimate of .21
for a period ahead, with a t − statistic = 0.49, hence insignificantly different than
zero. Two periods ahead, the multiplier is -.89, significant at the 10% level, with
a t − statistic = −1.91. Three periods ahead, the coefficient of the simple linear
regression is not significant.
Afterward, a robust regression is performed in order to account for outliers, thanks
to the command rreg 43. In this case, the estimates of β are 0.17, non significantly
different than zero after one period; -.83, significant two periods ahead; -1.96, non
significant again, after three periods.
42Obtained as a weighted average of the three main tax components in our dataset: personal,
corporate income, and value added tax.
43As Hamilton (2012) explains, recalled in Blanchard and Leigh (2013), the STATA command is
rreg, works by applying a simple OLS. Then, observations whose Cook’s distance is higher than
1 are deleted. In the end, through an iterative process, the program comes up with a down sized
measure of influential outliers.
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Table 1: Baseline regressions with lagged disaggregated tax shocks
Indep. Vars. GdpGrowthOLS GdpGrowthFE
Marg. ↗ PITt−1 rate -2.935 -0.993
(3.243) (3.150)
Marg. ↗ CITt−1 rate 6.512* 7.446**
(3.341) (3.069)
Marg. ↗ V ATt−1 rate -4.006 -1.895
(2.417) (2.340)
Marg. ↗ PITt−2 rate -0.820 1.091
(3.683) (3.360)
Marg. ↗ CITt−2 rate -0.532 -2.189
(4.172) (3.749)
Marg. ↗ V ATt−2 rate -0.210 0.829
(2.584) (2.318)
Marg. ↗ PITt−3 rate -5.731 -3.568
(3.470) (3.370)
Marg. ↗ CITt−3 rate 2.870 2.220
(4.132) (3.815)
Marg. ↗ V ATt−3 rate 0.464 3.502
(2.366) (2.394)
Constant 0.0200*** 0.0176***
(0.00600) (0.00543)
Observations 48 48
R-squared 0.248 0.745
Number of states 5
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: Baseline regressions with lagged aggregated tax shocks
Indep. Vars. GdpGrowth45 GdpGrowth46 GdpGrowth47
Marg. Tax ↗t−1 0.214 0.174 0.135
(0.438) (0.461) (0.385)
Marg. Tax ↗t−2 -0.892* -0.827* -1.015**
(0.468) (0.486) (0.402)
Marg Tax ↗t−3 -0.200 -1.964 0.151
(0.556) (1.494) (0.492)
Constant 0.0196*** 0.0208*** 0.0194***
(0.00512) (0.00533) (0.00432)
Observations 48 47 48
R-squared 0.085 0.107 0.205
Number of states 5
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Finally, the same variables are regressed with a different model, namely a fixed
effect estimator, accounting for time and space heterogeneities44. The results are
slightly similar to those obtained with the OLS, even if a bit more amplified. In
fact, if after one period the coefficient is non significantly amounting to .14, after
two is equal -1.02 with a t− statistic = −2.52. After three periods, the coefficient’s
estimate is insignificant.
5.5 Extensions
Extensions are explored along two dimensions. On the one side, the dependent
variable of real output growth is substituted with other macroeconomic variables,
specifically the relative variations in households consumption, in private investment,
in total unemployment, and in government debt to GDP. On the other side, keep-
ing the independent variable unchanged, a partition in the temporal dimension of
the sample is introduced within the baseline regression (panel with fixed effects),
measuring the effect of tax changes on output growth before and during a period of
economic crisis.
In the next table, outcomes of regressing lagged composite tax shocks on private
44The STATA command is, in this case, xtreg, fe.
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consumption and investment, unemployment, and debt to GDP are presented with
a fixed effects model. Firstly, the causal effect of variations in the level of taxes on
private consumption is studied. The coefficients found are at first sight negative, but
at a deeper view they are non significantly different than zero for all the three lags.
With regards to the GDP component of private investment, it is worthy to remark
that it is largely sensitive to the magnitude of tax changes. A tax shock occurring in
year t has a non significant effect on private sector investment in year t+ 1, despite
the coefficient’s sign is consistent with our hypothesis 48. Moving forwards to analyze
the consequence of a 1% tax increase in year t on private investment in year t+ 2, it
can be found that it is large in magnitude and highly significant, amounting to -2.32.
Finally, checking the response of a shock occurred three years aback, the effect on
private investment is again non-significant.
A positive relation linking a marginal tax hike in year t and the unemployment’s
level variation in year t + 1 is observable, i.e. a one 1% increase in taxes today
would produce a 2.81% raise in unemployed persons tomorrow. This coefficient is
the only having statistical significance, indeed, the β linking tax shocks of years t
with unemployment at times t+ 2 and t+ 3, are not significantly different than zero.
The principal reason why they are not, might simply be the paucity of observations
in our data-set. If this was the case, they could still have an economic significance:
the effects of a tax increase on unemployment after two periods is still high (2.40).
After three years the coefficient entirely loses its economic and statistical significance.
In order to correctly interpret the coefficients linking the revenue shocks with
government debt to GDP, it should be made a distinction between short and long
run effects of tax hikes. If the aim of an "exogenous" tax increase is to reduce gov-
ernment debt, it is also true that such effect will be verified over the long run. In the
short run instead, an increase in debt to GDP will take place, due to the reduction
in GDP growth. This behaviour is observed in the table, where two years after the
occurrence of the tax shocks, the debt to GDP rise is multiplied by a factor of 6.92.
Moreover, the baseline fixed effects equation has been re-estimated on two parti-
tions of the sample. One preceding the economic crisis, before 2008, and the other
during the recessionary period, after 2008. Interestingly, the related finding is that
the multiplier of the first partition is higher - in absolute value - than the one of
the crisis period. This evidence is opposite to the one suggested by Blanchard and
Leigh (2013), according to whom fiscal multipliers are higher in times of crises than
48Fiscal consolidations operated through tax hikes are more recessionary than those based on
spending cuts, is found by Alesina and Ardagna (2011).
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Table 3: Fixed effects regressions with new dependent variables
Indep. vars. ∆Priv. cons. ∆Priv. Inv. ∆Unempl. ∆DebtT oGdp
Marg. Tax ↗t−1 0.217 -0.804 2.810* 1.315
(0.437) (0.912) (1.639) (3.962)
Marg. Tax ↗t−2 -0.309 -2.405*** 2.402 6.920*
(0.417) (0.871) (1.566) (3.785)
Marg. tax ↗t−3 0.221 1.083 -0.00399 -1.634
(0.552) (1.151) (2.069) (5.001)
Constant 0.0155*** -0.0125 0.0682*** -0.0134
(0.00524) (0.0109) (0.0196) (0.0475)
Observations 41 41 41 41
R-squared 0.026 0.224 0.139 0.098
Number of states 5 5 5 5
∆ for each column stands for growth in the variable under consideration.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
in normal ones. Perhaps this divergence is explainable by differences in data, in-
deed Blanchard and Leigh (2013) employ IMF - World Economic Outlook data.
Also, their analysis is not meant to investigate the causal impact of tax changes on
output, rather to show how multipliers’ underestimation was connected to growth
forecast’s overestimation. Nevertheless, as our t-statistic suggests, the only coeffi-
cient which has an economic and statistical significance is the one relative to the
downturn period, rather than the one typical of the pre-crisis period.
6 Discussion
The results are consistent with the predictions. Exogenous fiscal shocks lead to an
unbiased estimate of the tax multiplier, differently than the traditional approach of
changes in cyclically adjusted revenues. The latter approach embraces all legislated
tax changes compared with GDP at its potential, ignoring the existing correlation
between short run fiscal measures and error terms in the regressions.
Our estimate of the tax multiplier on output is lighter in magnitude than the
one obtained in Romer and Romer (2010): -1 after two years, rather than -3 after
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Table 4: Fixed effects regressions with partitioned sample, pre and post 2008.
Indep. Vars. GDP growth49 GDP growth50
Marg. Tax ↗t−1 -0.125 0.308
(0.767) (0.360)
Marg. Tax ↗t−2 -0.961 -0.753*
(0.888) (0.368)
Marg. Tax ↗t−3 -0.661 0.409
(1.064) (0.466)
Constant 0.0480*** 0.000621
(0.00252) (0.00490)
Observations 18 30
R-squared 0.140 0.206
Number of states 4 5
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
three years from the occurrence of the shock. Cloyne (2011)’s estimate is larger in
absolute value than ours as well, the marginal effect of tax increases being estimated
in -2.5 on a twelve quarters horizon. The discrepancy might be explained by the
different natures on the datasets, theirs being a time series, ours being a panel, over
a shorter time span. In addition to that, it should be noted that Cloyne employed
a vector autoregressive technique, whereas Romer and Romer used both a single
equation model controlling for lagged growth, and a three variable VAR including
other macroeconomic variables.
Investigating the effects of tax increases at time t on private investment, we find a
strong, significant, and negative effect, amounting to -2.4, at t+2. This is consistent
with one of Blanchard and Perotti (2002)’s result, confirmed in Romer and Romer
(2010). Private investment suffers from tax increases more heavily than household
consumption, as the coefficients for the latter prove to be negative but insignificant
over a three years horizon.
Considering the results obtained by isolating the two subsamples, before and
after the beginning of the crisis, the interpretation is not straightforward. Whether
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) find higher growth forecast errors in times of financial
crisis, with a larger underestimation of the multipliers, in this study there seems to
be a higher multiplier before 2008 than after. However, between the two estimates,
the only one which shows statistical significance is that typical of the crisis period.
Estimating the tax multiplier on unemployment, it is found that a marginal
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increase in fiscal pressure (1% of GDP) has a strong and positive effect on unem-
ployment, raising the share of jobless population by 2.8% in the first year after the
tax change is issued. This finding is complementary to the one in Ramey (2012), in
which she shows that increases in government spending lower unemployment.
7 Conclusions
This paper illustrated the construction of an exogenous panel of fiscal shocks for
five countries of Southern Europe - France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain -
for the last twelve years. Raw data have been obtained from EC discretionary tax
measures files as well as Ameco database, which have been filtered through the study
of institutional tracks (financial laws and budget speeches). The aim was to discern
between those legislated variations motivated by exogenous or endogenous reasons
with respect to the business cycle. An overall estimate of the tax multiplier on output
has been performed, firstly considering disaggregated measures of the tax changes,
next a total one.
Summing up, a negative tax shock has recessionary macroeconomic effects on our
countries’ sample, lowering output growth by a factor of one on impact, also strongly
discouraging private investment over a two years horizon, increasing unemployment
and raising government debt. Since the negative output effects appear to be stronger
in times of crisis, it is recommendable to implement a tax based adjustment in normal
times, rather than during an economic crisis.
No concern is expressed on whether the effects on output are due to supply
side stimulus or to demand incentive (higher disposable income). Even if the non-
persistence of the shocks suggests the predominance of demand side effects, one
should be cautious in declaring this conclusion. The data do not shed light on
the government spending multiplier, rather considers isolated discrete shocks on the
revenue side. Further research is needed in order to assess the relative impact on
output of spending and tax-based adjustments, relying on a narrative approach.
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Figure 1: Correlation between personal income tax shocks in absolute value and
output (GDP) growth for the pooled sample.
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Figure 2: Correlation between corporate income tax shocks in absolute value and
output (GDP) growth for the pooled sample.
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Figure 3: Correlation between value added tax shocks in absolute value and output
(GDP) growth for the pooled sample.
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Figure 4: By country.
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Figure 5: By country.
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Figure 6: By country.
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Figure 7: France’s all exogenous Tax Shocks in percentage of its level of GDP.
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Figure 8: Germany’s all exogenous Tax Shocks in percentage of its level of GDP.
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Figure 9: Greece’s all exogenous Tax Shocks in percentage of its level of GDP.
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Figure 10: Italy’s all exogenous Tax Shocks in percentage of its GDP in levels.
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Figure 11: Portugal’s all exogenous Tax Shocks in percentage of its level of GDP.
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Figure 12: Spain’s all exogenous Tax Shocks in percentage of its GDP in levels.
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